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Both the constitutional and policy reasons set forth above appear to
warrant reversal by the United States Supreme Court.
HENRY J. VAN WAGENINGEN
SIX-MEMBER CIVIL JURY ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL
After a federal district court judge scheduled this civil diversity
case to be tried before a six-member jury, as required by the local rules
of the United States District Court of Montana,' petitioner filed a writ
of mandamus to direct the judge to impanel a jury of twelve. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the writ.' On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed: The local
federal court rule providing for six-member juries in civil suits does not
violate either the seventh amendment3 or rule 48 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." Colgrove v. Battin, 93 S. Ct. 2448 (1973).
There has been much debate as to the interpretation of the words
of the seventh amendment providing that "[i]n suits at common law
... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .. .according to the
rules of the common law." One view would incorporate into the American
jury trial system all the common law rules regarding jury trials. The
Supreme Court in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof5 found that the jury trial
referred to in the Constitution is the same as it existed in England at the
time the Constitution was adopted. Thus, it has been held that a consti-
tutional jury requires twelve men, even though the number is not speci-
fied in the Constitution, and that with less than twelve there is no jury at
all.' Twelve-member juries have also been given great support in other
federal court decisions."
A second interpretation of the seventh amendment is that the jury
trial should be preserved in its most fundamental form without including
prominent lay figures in the community. See A. BALK, A FREE AND RESPONSIVE PRESS (1973);
BACK TALK: PRESS COUNCILS IN AMERICA (W. Rivers ed. 1972).
1. "A jury for the trial of civil cases shall consist of six persons .... " U.S. DiST. CT.
FOR DIST. OF MONT. (Civ.) R. 13(d)(1).
2. Colgrove v. Battin, 456 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1972).
3. "In suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
4. "The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than
twelve . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 48.
5. 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
6. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). This case discussed the "trial by
jury" clause of the sixth amendment.
7. E.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898); Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942).
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all of the procedural details which existed at common law." "Procedural,"
in this context, includes such rules as pertain to the size of the jury
and the type of verdict rendered (unanimous v. majority). This is con-
trasted with the "substantive" right to a jury trial, which is determined
by the type of case in question. It is in actions at law, as opposed to those
in equity, that the right to a jury trial exists. Since the purpose of the
amendment is to preserve for the jury questions of fact in common law
actions,9 it has been held that the clause was intended by the framers of
the Constitution to differentiate between law and equity. Thus, only the
substantive, and not the procedural right to a trial by jury is preserved
in the seventh amendment." In following the second view, the Court in
Colgrove concluded
that by referring to the "common law," the Framers of the
Seventh Amendment were concerned with preserving the right
of trial by jury in civil cases where it existed at common law,
rather than the various incidents of trial by jury."
Having established the intent of the framers, the Court proceeded
to determine the purpose of having a jury composed of a specific number
of members and to test the significance of having twelve jurors as com-
pared to six. Since the importance of jury size lies in preserving the
purpose and function of a jury trial,'2
the number should probably be large enough to promote group
deliberation, free from outside [pressures] ... , and to pro-
vide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-
section of the community.'
3
The significance of the number twelve has no relation to the jury func-
tions. An example of why the number was chosen is that "the number of
12 is much respected in the Holy Writ, as 12 Apostles, 12 stones, 12
tribes, etc."' 4 After discussing the origin of the number twelve, the Court
in Williams v. Florida found,
that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a
8. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
9. Walker v. New Mexico & S.R.R., 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
10. Cooley v. Strickland Transp. Co., 459 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1972). The dissent in this
case supported the holding in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899); accord,
Colgrove v. Battin, 456 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1972). The ninth circuit interpreted "as
at common law" to mean "in those cases in which the right existed at common law." The
court was referring to the distinction between cases at law and equity.
11. 93 S. Ct. at 2452.
12. For the purpose of having a jury trial, see Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1970).
13. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
14. Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51
GEO. L.. 120 (1962), citing 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 155 (1797).
For other discussions on the origin of the number twelve, see Tamm, A Proposal for Five-
Member Juries in the Federal Courts, 50 A.B.A.J. 162, 164 (1964).
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historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the
jury system and wholly without significance "except to mys-
tics."15
One purpose of the jury is to bring together diverse viewpoints that
exist in the community among various interest groups.' Any reduction
in the number of jurors has been found by at least one court to be
inconsistent with the desire to increase representation of minority
groups.' 7 However, in Williams, the Supreme Court said:
As long as arbitrary exclusions of a particular class from the
jury rolls are forbidden, the concern that the cross-section will
be significantly diminished if the jury is decreased in size from
12 to six seems an unrealistic one.' 8
It appears that the Court is saying that there can be just as much a
representation of community interests with a jury of six as there is with
one of twelve. Thus, the Supreme Court in Colgrove found no legal basis
for having specifically twelve jurors.
There have been a number of studies made concerning the differ-
ences between twelve and six-member juries with respect to deliberation
processes, verdicts and numbers of "hung" juries. These studies on civil
cases show no significant variation between the types of verdicts ren-
dered.'
The holding of the Supreme Court in Williams had a significant
effect on the Colgrove decision. In Williams the Supreme Court held that
six-member juries in state cases were not in violation of the sixth amend-
ment,20 made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment.21 Even though Williams applied to criminal suits on the state
level, the rationale used is similar to that in the Colgrove case, since
interpretation of the sixth amendment right to jury trial22 was used for
the decision in the criminal case28 and in Colgrove.
15. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Williams].
16. Zeisel, The Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A.J. 367 (1972).
17. Winsby v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 336 F. Supp. 663 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
18. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970). The Court also said that there is no
guaranty that twelve will be representative of every viewpoint in society. For a statistical
analysis of the differences between twelve and six member juries in terms of representing
the community, see Zeisel, The Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A.J. 367, 368 (1972).
19. For studies on verdict and hung jury variations, see Zeisel, supra note 16, at 368;
Note, Six-Member and Twelve-Member Juries: An Empirical Study of Trial Results, 6
U. MiCH. J.L. REFORm 671 (1973); Bermant & Coppock, Outcomes of Six- and Twelve-
Member Jury Trials: An Analysis of 128 Civil Cases in the State of Washington, 48 WAsH.
L. REV. 593 (1973). For a discussion of other studies and reasons why the results are un-
reliable, see Zeisel, . . .And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury,
38 U. Cm. L. REV. 710 (1971). This study found that the differences among the different
sized juries were negligible only under a superficial scrutiny.
20. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
21. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
22. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right [to trial by impartial
jury]. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
23. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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However, there are conflicting arguments as to whether the Wil-
liams decision, dealing as it did with a criminal case, should have been
utilized in Colgrove, a civil case, as a basis for decision. In support of
utilizing Williams is the position that if criminal juries can be less than
twelve, so may civil juries.24 Thus, it is contended that there should be
a stronger argument for a twelve-member jury in criminal cases because
the possibility exists in those actions for greater penalties, and there is a
requirement of a higher standard of proof than in civil actions. A smaller
jury in civil trials would inevitably be of less consequence.
The opposing argument is that the seventh amendment makes refer-
ence to the common law and the sixth amendment does not; therefore,
the common law requirements should be maintained in civil actions,
though not in criminal ones.25 The Colgrove Court was not persuaded to
"depart from the conclusion reached in Williams," and stated that if a
jury of six satisfies the sixth amendment, then it satisfies the seventh
amendment.2"
Although the Court declared six-member juries not to be a violation
of the seventh amendment, it was argued in Colgrove that they are in
violation of rules 48 and 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 48 allows "the parties to stipulate that the jury shall consist of any
number less than twelve."28 According to rule 83, any district court may
amend any rule provided such amendment is not inconsistent with the
prevailing rules.29 The United States District Court of Montana estab-
lished a local rule providing for six-member juries in civil suits. 0 The
Court considered whether this local rule was in violation of rules 48 and
83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in that it precluded any
stipulation by the parties for a jury of less than twelve but greater than
six.
An examination of decisions interpreting rule 48 provides insight as
to how the Supreme Court in Colgrove reconciled this apparent incon-
sistency. The lower court in Colgrove found that rule 48 does not re-
quire a twelve-man jury even though the rule was adopted prior to
Williams, at a time when twelve was thought to be a constitutional re-
quirement.8 ' "[An] inference that Rule 48 now requires a jury of twelve
absent a stipulation is . . . not a proper post-Williams interpretation of
24. Powell, Reducing the Size of Juries, 5 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 87 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Powell].
25. Id.
26. 93 S. Ct. at 2454.
27. The Supreme Court has the right to prescribe rules of procedure for the federal
district courts in civil suits. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). Rules provided by the Supreme Court
and courts established by acts of Congress must be consistent with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 48.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
30. U.S. DIST. CT. FOR DIST. OF MONT. (Civ.) R. 13(d) (1).
31. Colgrove v. Battin, 456 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1972).
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the Rule." 2 In Fox v. United States, a case decided prior to Williams,
the court held that rule 48 does guarantee a jury of twelve, unless a
stipulation is made by the parties to have less. 83 The same court of ap-
peals, two years later and subsequent to the Williams decision, in the
case of Cooley v. Strickland Transportation Co.,84 held that rule 48 does
not guarantee a jury of twelve, because if that were the intention, it
would have been so specified. The court also said that although rule 48
allows parties to stipulate as to a jury of less than twelve, nothing pro-
hibits courts from making rules reducing the number of jurors. 5
The Supreme Court in Colgrove agreed with the court in Cooley v.
Strickland Transp. Co., 6 holding that rule 48 does not prohibit federal
courts from making their own rules reducing the size of civil juries. 7 In
so doing, however, the Court did not establish any guidelines as to the
minimum number of jurors required to compose a jury. The Court sim-
ply stated that the Montana rule was constitutional. The question re-
mains as to whether a jury of five, four or even thirty would also be
allowed.
Since the present suit was a civil action, the holding does not apply
to criminal cases at the federal level. 8 Nevertheless, since Williams
opened the door to the present decision, it appears only a matter of time
before juries of less than twelve will be allowed at the federal level in
criminal actions. The Colgrove decision has no effect on the state level.
The seventh amendment is not applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment.8 9 Therefore, under a state statute or constitution
state juries may consist of less than twelve.4"
A problem in the decision lies in not establishing a guideline as to
the minimum number of jurors required. As it stands now, a federal dis-
trict court can apparently provide for a jury of three, and not be in vio-
lation of any law. Colgrove allowed six-member juries, but said nothing
about a smaller jury. As a result of this omission, a further delineation
may be required to determine the minimum number of jurors required
to ensure that the function of a jury will not be impaired and that a
fair trial will continue to be provided.
The question still remains, what effect will the six-member panel
32. Id. at 1381, citing Devitt, The Six Man Jury in the Federal Court, 53 F.R.D. 273,
274 n.1 (1971).
33. 417 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1969).
34. 459 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1972).
35. Id. For a list of federal district courts which have established local rules reducing
the jury size, their applications and limitations, see Fisher, The Seventh Amendment and the
Common Law: No Magic in Numbers, 56 F.R.D. 507, 535 (1973).
36. 459 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1972).
37. 93 S. Ct. at 2457.
38. Stipulation by the parties is necessary for a jury of less than twelve in criminal
cases. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b).
39. Winsby v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 336 F. Supp. 663 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
40. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 53.041 (1971). "In all civil actions when a jury is impaneled,
a jury of six qualified jurors is sufficient."
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have upon the trial system? There are distinct advantages to having a
six-member jury; less time is needed to impanel juries, court costs are
reduced, and possibly less time will be needed in deciding cases. 1 The
time spent during the trial itself is shortened since, presumably, six per-
sons can look at exhibits and make their exits and entries quicker than
twelve persons. In addition, time spent in polling the jury will be les-
sened. Even though the time saved with each case will be negligible,
when all cases are considered together, the time saved will be significant.4
The way appears clear for additional improvements, which may
enable speedier and less expensive trials without affecting the "fairness"
of a trial by jury. Since a majority of federal district courts have already
passed local rules reducing the size of their juries, this decision serves to
lend support to what has already been done.
DEBRA J. Kossow
SECURITY INTERESTS: SELF-HELP STILL AN AVAILABLE
METHOD OF REPOSSESSION
Plaintiff bought an automobile from defendant under a conditional
sales agreement. The contract provided that in the event of default, de-
fendant would have all the rights and remedies of a secured party under
the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in Florida. Upon default by
plaintiff, defendant, without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, took pos-
session of the car pursuant to section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.' Plaintiff brought suit for unlawful conversion and damages. The
trial court, relying upon Fuentes v. Shevin, granted plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment, holding that section 9-503, as applied to the
facts and circumstances of the instant case, violated plaintiff's proced-
ural due process rights under the fourteenth amendment. On direct ap-
41. Croake, Memorandum on the Advisability and Constitutionality of Six Man Juries
and 5/6 Verdicts in Civil Cases, 44 N.Y. STATE B.J. 385 1972). For an estimate as to how
much money will be saved, see Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution
of the Federal Jury, 38 U. Cm L. REv. 710, 711 (1971). As for less time to impanel juries,
it has been argued that attorneys may be more selective in their voir dire examinations when
facing the prospect of a six-member jury. However, ethical considerations require attorneys
to take great care in the selection of each juror, regardless of the prospective jury size. Powell,
supra note 24, at 87.
42. Powell, supra note 24, at 87.
1. FLA. STAT. § 679.503 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as section 9-503].
2. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Fuentes]. In Fuentes, the Supreme
Court found Florida's prejudgment repelvin statute and a similar Pennsylvania statute invalid
under the fourteenth amendment. The Florida statute provided that upon posting a bond of
double the value of the chattel sought to be seized, a creditor could interpose the sheriff be-
tween himself and the debtor in a repossession. FLA. STAT. §§ 78.01, .07, .08, .10, .13 (1971).
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